


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
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary Brown, 10 November 1977



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2. Under the PRM egis, Defense is doing a study on sustainability of our forces. This will require estimates of the sustaining power of the Warsaw Pact Forces and perhaps others. Because of the importance of this study on our force structure, the Secretary of Defense requests that CIA participate in the estimates of other force sustaining capabilities. I assured him that we would. (Turn this over to Bob Bowie to get in contact with them.)



25X1

-2-

4. We discussed the DIA building and the NITC location. The Secretary sees the two items as related in the sense that all the production effort will be in one place and all the tasking efforts consolidated in another. I agreed I'd be back to him after I talk with [redacted] next week and give him our preliminary indications. He is continuing to make a survey of places that could be made available in the Pentagon for NITC. He understood our budget has room for [redacted] people for NITC. I told him I didn't know if that was there and that we had not settled on the size for NITC at this time.

25X1

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5. NIE 3-8. The Secretary was concerned at the static indicator of hard target potential. He felt that if this was a function of K factor and target hardness, as I described, it could be misleading. In short, with a very good CEP you get a very high K factor, but if you don't have enough very hard targets a lot of that K factor simply is not usable. I was unable to answer him on that point.

6. In looking at our dynamic indicators, he was clearly concerned that these were net assessments which he feels belong in the Defense realm. He was also concerned at what U.S. force we were showing, since some of the forces for the out-years are not even budgeted as yet and may well change. His basic concern is what kind of an attack will be made on these ten dynamic indicator charts as to their assumptions, not with the preparation, etc. He's worried that they will become the focus of SALT debate in January and that if we cannot defend them readily it may appear bad. He wants to be sure his systems analysis shop is in on the review of these. I suggest Howie Stoertz contact [redacted] and tell him of this conversation (I'll do it when I get back if that would be better). I'd suggest that the systems analysis computer report people, as well as the Defense Intelligence Agency people get in on the act of checking on methodology.

25X1

7. I thanked the Secretary for his memorandum on his visit to Yugoslavia.

8. We discussed the PRC (I) meeting on the budget and imagery mix. He agreed with me this is not to be a meeting to rearrange the budget, but to give people an understanding of imagery mix situations and what case can be made for an add-on to the OMB guidance budget. There was a brief discussion on whether this meeting should precede or follow the "Twenty Questions" meeting. None of us felt strongly one way or the other. I indicated I'd take a look at it again on Tuesday after we put the budget to bed. I doubt if we could be ready for a good budget/imagery mix presentation by Friday the 18th.

25X1

[redacted]
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	ADDCI		X		
3	AD/DCI/IC	X (paras. 3 & 8)			
4	D/DCI/NI	X (paras. 2, 5, & 6)			
5	D/DCI/CT	X (para. 4)			
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	OGC		X		
9	OLC	X (para. 1)			
10					
11					
12	ES		X		

SUSPENSE _____
Date _____

0 November 1977

Remarks:

Automatic & no suspense

D/ Executive Secretary
11 November 1977
Date

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(EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT)
Defense

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